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Abstract. We report quantitative relations between corruption level and economic factors,
such as country wealth and foreign investment per capita, which are characterized by a
power law spanning multiple scales of wealth and investments per capita. These relations
hold for diverse countries, and also remain stable over different time periods. We also observe
a negative correlation between level of corruption and long-term economic growth. We find
similar results for two independent indices of corruption, suggesting that the relation between
corruption and wealth does not depend on the specific measure of corruption. The functional
relations we report have implications when assessing the relative level of corruption for two
countries with comparable wealth, and for quantifying the impact of corruption on economic
growth and foreign investments.
PACS. 89.90.+n Other topic in areas of applied and interdisciplinary physics. – 05.45.Tp
Time series analysis. – 05.40.Fb Random walks and Levy flights.
1 Introduction
Corruption influences important aspects of social and eco-
nomic life. The level of corruption in a given country is
widely believed to be an important factor to consider when
projecting economic growth, estimating the effectiveness
of the government administration, making decisions for
strategic investments, and forming international policies.
The relation between corruption level and key parame-
ters of economic performance is largely qualitative [1,2,3,
4,5,6,7,8]. Corruption has become increasingly important
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with the globalization of the international economic and
political relations between countries, which has led vari-
ous governmental and non-governmental organizations to
search for adequate measures to quantify levels of corrup-
tion [1,2,9,10,11,12].
Systematic studies of corruption have been hampered
because of the complexity and secretive nature of corrup-
tion, making it difficult to quantify. There have been con-
certed efforts to introduce quantitative measures suitable
for describing levels of corruption across diverse countries
[13,14,15]. However, a specific functional dependence be-
tween quantitative measures of corruption and economic
performance has not been established.
Previous studies have suggested a negative associa-
tion between corruption level and country wealth [1,2,3].
There is active debate concerning the relation between
corruption level and economic growth [16,17]. Some ear-
lier studies suggest that corruption may help the most ef-
ficient firms bypass bureaucratic obstacles and rigid laws
[4,5] leading to a positive effect on economic growth, while
more recent works do not find a significant negative de-
pendence between corruption and growth [1,2]. Further,
studies of net flow of foreign investment report conflicting
results. Some studies find no significant correlation be-
tween inward foreign investment and corruption level in
host countries [6,7], while others indicate a negative asso-
ciation between corruption and foreign investments [2,8].
This debate reflects the inherent complexity of the prob-
lem as countries in the world vary dramatically in their
social and economic development [18]. Thus, an open ques-
tion remains whether there is a general functional relation
between corruption level and key aspects of the economic
performance of different countries.
We develop and test the hypothesis that there may be a
power-law dependence between corruption level and eco-
nomic performance which holds across diverse countries
regardless of differences in specific country characteristics
such as country wealth (defined in our paper as gross do-
mestic product per capita) or foreign direct investment.
Recent studies show that diverse social and economic sys-
tems exhibit scale invariant behavior — e.g., size rank-
ing and growth of firms, universities, urban centers, coun-
tries and even people’s personal fortunes follow a power
law over a broad range of scales [19,20,21,22,23,24,25,
26]. Since countries in the world greatly differ in their
wealth and foreign investments, we test the possibility
that there may be an underlying organization, such that
the cross-country relations between corruption level and
country wealth, and corruption level and foreign invest-
ments exhibit a significant negative correlation character-
ized by scale-invariant properties over multiple scales, and
thus they can be described by power laws. Specifically, we
test if this scale-invariant behavior remains stable over
different time periods, as well as its validity for different
subgroups of countries. Finally, we demonstrate a strong
correlation between corruption level and past long-term
economic growth.
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2 Data and Methods
We analyze the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) [14,
27] introduced by Transparency International [14], a global
civil organization supported by a wide network of govern-
ment agencies, developmental organizations, foundations,
public institutions, the private sector, and individuals.
The CPI is a composite index based on independent sur-
veys of business people and on assessments of corruption
in different countries provided by more than ten indepen-
dent institutions around the world, including the World
Economic Forum, United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Interna-
tional Institute for Management Development [27]. The
CPI spans 10-year period 1996-2005. The different surveys
and assessments use diverse sampling frames and different
methodologies. Some of the institutions consult a panel of
experts to assess the level of corruption, while others, such
as the International Institute for Management Develop-
ment and the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy,
turn to elite businessmen and businesswomen from differ-
ent industries. Further, certain institutions gather infor-
mation about the perceptions of corruption from residents
with respect to the performance of their home countries,
while other institutions survey the perceptions of non-
residents in regard to foreign countries or specifically in
regard to neighboring countries. All sources employ a ho-
mogeneous definition of corruption as the misuse of pub-
lic power for private benefit, such as bribing public offi-
cials, kickbacks in public procurement, or embezzlement
of public funds. Each of these sources also assesses the
“extent” of corruption among public officials and politi-
cians in different countries. Transparency International
uses non-parametric statistics for standardizing the data
and for determining the precision of the scores [27]. While
there is a certain subjectivity in people’s perceptions of
corruption, the large number of independent surveys and
assessments based on different methodologies averages out
most of the bias. The CPI ranges from 0 (highly corrupt)
to 10 (highly transparent).
We also analyze a different measure of corruption, the
Control of Corruption Index (CCI) [9,15] provided by the
World Bank [15]. The CCI ranges from –2.5 to 2.5, with
positive numbers indicating low levels of corruption. As
a measure of country wealth, we use the gdp, defined to
be the annual nominal gross domestic product per capita
in current prices in U.S. dollars, provided by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) [28] over the 26-year period
1980-2005. As a measure of foreign direct investment we
use annual data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
[29] of the United States (U.S.) government, which repre-
sents the direct investment received by different countries
from the U.S. over the period 2000-2004. These data are
appropriate for our study since (i) the U.S. has been the
dominant source of foreign investment in the past decades
and (ii) the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)
[30] holds U.S. companies legally liable for bribing for-
eign government officials, which makes the U.S. a source
country which penalizes its multinational companies for
corruption practices [8].
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3 Results and Discussion
3.1 Relation Between Corruption Level and Country
Wealth.
To test if there is a common functional dependence be-
tween corruption level and country wealth, we plot the
CPI versus gdp for different countries [Fig. 1(a-e)]. We find
a positive correlation between CPI and country wealth,
which can be well approximated by a power law
CPI ∼ (gdp)µ, (1)
where µ > 0, indicating that richer countries are less cor-
rupt. Most countries fall close to the power-law fitting line
shown in Fig. 1, consistent with specific functional relation
between corruption and country wealth even for countries
characterized by levels of wealth ranging over a factor of
103. This finding in Eq. (1) indicates that the relative cor-
ruption level between two countries should be considered
not only in terms of CPI values but also in the context of
country wealth. For example, two countries with a large
difference in their gdp on average will not have the same
level of corruption, as our results quantify the degree to
which poorer countries with lower gdp have higher levels
of corruption.
The quantitative relation between CPI and gdp for all
countries in the world — represented by the power-law fit-
ting curves in Fig. 1 — indicates where is the “expected”
level of corruption for a given level of wealth. A country
above (or below) the fitting line is less (or more) corrupt
than expected for its level of wealth. For example, com-
paring the relative corruption level of two countries with
similar gdp such as Bulgaria and Romania, one can as-
sess that Bulgaria is less corrupt than Romania [Fig. 3].
Depending whether a specific country is above (e.g., Bul-
garia) or below (e.g., Romania) the power-law fit, one can
assess if this country is less (or more) corrupt relative to
the average level of corruption corresponding to the wealth
of this country.
Moreover, the quantitative dependence we find in Eq.
(1) allows us to compare the relative levels of corrup-
tion between two countries which belong to two different
wealth brackets. Specifically, two countries with a very dif-
ferent gdp should not be compared only by the value of
their CPI, but also by their relative distances from the
power-law fitting line which indicates the expected level
of corruption. For example, Bulgaria and Slovenia differ
significantly in their wealth (Slovenia has ≈ 5 times higher
gdp), but both countries are at equal distances above the
fitting line, indicating (i) that both countries are less cor-
rupt than the corruption level expected for their corre-
sponding wealth and (ii) that the relative level of corrup-
tion of Slovenia within the group of countries falling in
the same gdp bracket as Slovenia is similar to the relative
corruption level of Bulgaria within the group of countries
falling in the same gdp bracket as Bulgaria [Fig. 3].
To test how robust is the power-law dependence be-
tween corruption and country wealth, we analyze groups
containing different numbers of countries, and we find that
Eq. (1) holds, with similar values of µ [Fig. 1(a-e)]. Aver-
aging the power-law exponent µ for different years and for
different number of countries we find µ ≈0.27±∆, where
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Fig. 1. Log-log plots of the corruption perceptions index (CPI) versus GDP per capita (gdp) indicating a power-law functional
dependence. A low value of CPI corresponds to a high level of corruption [14]. Data on gdp are obtained as current prices in
U.S. dollars [28]. (a)-(e) The power-law functional dependence remains stable over different time periods, and is characterized
by similar values of the exponent µ for different years and different number of countries. The power-law fit indicates the
expected level of corruption expected for given country wealth. Note that, comparing two countries with a similar gdp, the
country placed above the power-law fit is less corrupt than one would expect for its level of wealth, while the country below
the power-law curve has a relatively higher level of corruption than one would expect for its wealth. (f) We obtain similar
results for the adjusted control of corruption index CCIad [15], which is independent of CPI, indicating that the scale-invariant
relation between corruption and wealth does not depend on the specific measure of corruption. Vertical dashed lines in the
panels seperate the top 30 wealthiest countries. (see Fig. 5 and Fig. 6)
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∆=0.02 is the standard deviation. For the CPI and gdp
data we find an average correlation coefficient of 0.86. We
also note that the inverse relation of gdp as a function of
CPI is characterized by an exponent µˆ which is not equal
to 1/µ as one might expect, since the correlation coeffi-
cient of the data fit is less than 1. Next, we analyze data
comprising the same set of countries for different years
[Fig. 2], and we find that the power-law dependence of
Eq. (1) remains stable in time over periods shorter than
a decade, with similar and slightly decreasing values for
µ [Fig. 1 and Fig. 2]. Similar results we obtain also for
the period 1996-2000 (not shown in the figures as avail-
able data cover much smaller number of countries for that
period).
Given the facts that (i) the number of countries we
analyze changes from 90 to 153, and (ii) that the time
horizon of 5-6 years we consider could be sufficient for
significant changes in both corruption level and wealth
(e.g., the case of Eastern European countries), our finding
of a power-law relationship in Eq. (1) is consistent with a
universal dependence between gdp and CPI across diverse
countries. We note that the power-law relation in Eq. (1)
holds when gdp is calculated both as current prices in US
dollars [Fig. 1 and Fig. 2], as well as the value based on
purchasing power parity [Fig. 4]. Further, Eq. (1) implies
that lowering the corruption level of a country would lead
to an increase in its gdp and vice versa—e.g., for a country
with gdp ≈ $4000 an increase in CPI of 0.25 units would
lead to increase in the gdp of approximately $700 [Fig. 1
and Fig. 2].
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Fig. 2. Log-log plots of the corruption perceptions index (CPI)
versus GDP per capita (gdp) for a subset of 130 countries over
the period 2003-2005. The same set of countries is presented
in each plot, indicating that the power-law exponent µ charac-
terizing the relation between CPI and gdp remains relatively
stable over the considered period. As rich countries have a rel-
atively higher gdp growth rate compared to poor countries (see
Fig. 8 below), and because CPI is defined in a bounded inter-
val, we expect the value of the exponent µ to decrease slightly
with time when considering time horizons larger than a decade.
To confirm that our findings do not depend on the
specific choice of the measure of corruption, we repeat
our analysis for a different index, the CCI [9,15]. As the
CCI is defined in the interval [–2.5, 2.5] we use a linear
transformation to obtain the adjusted CCI, CCIad ≡ 2×
(CCI + 2.5), so that both CCIad and CPI are defined in
the same interval from 0 to 10. We find that CCIad also
exhibits a power-law behavior as a function of gdp with
a similar value of the power-law exponent µ as obtained
for CPI [Fig. 1(f)]. So, the specific interval in which the
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Fig. 3. Same as panel (e) in Fig. 1 except we now identify
by filled symbols the subset of the 153 countries, which are
recently-accepted members of the European Union and candi-
dates. Although this subset varies greatly in wealth and corrup-
tion level, data also follow a similar scale-invariant behavior.
corruption index is defined does not affect the nature of
our findings.
We note that there is no artificially imposed scale on
the values of the CPI or CCI index for different countries.
While the upper and lower bounds for the CPI or CCI
index are indeed pre-determined, the intrinsic relative re-
lation between the index values for different countries is
inherent to the data. There is no logarithmic scale artifi-
cially imposed on the index values of each country (see de-
tails on the CPI and CCI methodology in [14,15,27]). The
fact that we obtain practically identical results (power-
law dependence with similar values of the exponent µ) for
two independent indices CPI and CCI, which are provided
by different institutions and are calculated using different
methodologies, indicates that the quantitative relation of
Eq. (1) is not an artifact of subjective evaluation of cor-
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Fig. 4. Log-log plots of the corruption perceptions index
(CPI) versus GDP per capita (gdp) for the same years as shown
in panels (d) and (e) in Fig. 1, indicating a power-law func-
tional dependence similar to Fig. 1. Data on gdp are obtained
based on purchasing power parity in U.S dollars [28]. A low
value of CPI corresponds to a high level of corruption [14]. The
power-law relation between CPI and gdp remains stable also
for constant prices across different years and different number
of countries, and is characterized by a similar value of the ex-
ponent µ as for current prices. We note that the slightly higher
value of µCPI observed here compared with Fig. 1 and Fig. 2
is due to the slight reduction in the different between wealthy
and poor countries when gdp is measured based on purchasing
power parity. The group average and standard deviation of the
CPI for five subgroups of countries for both years are shown
with filled squares. The power-law fit across all countries in-
dicates the expected level of corruption for a given range of
country wealth.
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ruption. In summary, our empirical results indicate that
the power-law relation between corruption and gdp across
countries does not depend on the specific subset of chosen
countries (provided they span a broad range of gdp), does
not depend on the specific measure of corruption (CPI and
CCI), and does not change significantly over time horizons
shorter than a decade.
3.2 Corruption Level and Country Wealth Rank
Curves.
We next rank countries by their gdp and by their CPI. We
find that gdp versus rank exhibits an exponential behavior
for countries with rank larger than 30, and a pronounced
crossover to a power-law behavior for the wealthiest 30
countries [Fig. 5]. We further find that the shape of gdp
versus rank curve remains unchanged for different years,
and that increasing the number of countries we consider
only extends the range of the exponential tail. Our find-
ings for the shape of the gdp versus rank curve differ from
earlier reports [31,32]. We find that the CPI versus rank
curve exhibits a behavior similarly to that of the gdp ver-
sus rank curve, with a crossover from a power law to an
exponential tail for countries with rank larger than 30.
The shape of the CPI versus rank curve also remains un-
changed when we repeat the analysis for different years
[Fig. 6]. We find that the ranking of countries based on
gdp practically matches the ranking based on the CPI in-
dex. This is evidence of a strong and positive correlation
between the ranking of wealth and the ranking of corrup-
tion. Since the gdp rank is an unambiguous result of an
objective quantitative measure, the evidence of a strong
correlation of the CPI rank with the gdp rank we observe
in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 indicates that the CPI values are not
subjective, and that our finding of a power-law relation be-
tween CPI and gdp in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 is not an artifact
of an arbitrary scale imposed on the CPI or on the CCI.
Further, we compare the values of the decay parameters
ζCPI and ζgdp characterizing the exponential behavior of
the CPI and gdp rank curves,
CPI ∼ exp(ζCPI ·RCPI), (2)
and
gdp ∼ exp(ζgdp · Rgdp), (3)
where RCPI and Rgdp index the rank order of CPI and
gdp respectively.
We find that for each year the ratio ζCPI/ζgdp repro-
duces the value of the power-law exponent µ defined in
Eq. (1) for the same year — an insightful result since it
would hold only when RCPI is similar to Rgdp . Indeed,
only when RCPI ≈ Rgdp we obtain from Eq. (2) and Eq.
(3) the relation between log(CPI) and log(gdp),
log(CPI) ≈ (ζCPI/ζgdp) · log(gdp). (4)
Combining Eq. (1) and Eq. (4), we see that
µ = ζCPI/ζgdp . (5)
Thus, for each year the power-law dependence between
CPI and gdp in Eq. (1) is directly related to the expo-
nential behavior of the CPI and gdp versus rank [Eq. (2)
and Eq. (3)]. We note that this relation does not hold for
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the top 30 wealthiest countries, for which there is an en-
hanced economic interaction in a globalization sense, per-
haps leading to similarities in development patterns and
overall decrease in the gdp growth difference [33,34]
3.3 Relation Between Corruption Level and Foreign
Direct Investment.
We next investigate how the corruption level relates to
foreign direct investment. We consider the amount of in-
ward investments received by different countries from the
United States (U.S.). Investments originating from the
U.S. are sensitive to corruption, since U.S. legislation holds
American investors in other countries liable for corruption
practices [30]. We find a strong dependence of the amount
of U.S. direct investments in a given country on the cor-
ruption level in that country [Fig. 7]. Specifically, we find
that the functional dependence between U.S. direct invest-
ments per capita, I, and the corruption levels across coun-
tries exhibits scale-invariant behavior characterized by a
power law ranging over at least a factor of 103 [Fig. 7]
CPI ∼ I λ. (6)
We find that less corrupt countries have received more
U.S. investment per capita, and that Eq. (6) also holds
for different years. In particular, we find that groups of
countries from different continents, which differ in both
gdp and average CPI, are characterized by different val-
ues of λ [Fig. 7]. We obtain similar results when repeating
our analysis for the CCI, suggesting that the power-law
relation in Eq. (6) between corruption level and foreign
direct investment per capita does not depend on the spe-
cific measure of corruption used. We also note that the
1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act [30] only precludes
American firms from entering corruption deals, but does
not dictate in which country and how much money the
American firms should invest. Therefore, the statistical
regularities we find in Fig. 7 cannot arise from legislatory
measures against foreign corruption.
3.4 Relation Between Corruption Level and Growth
Rate.
Finally, we investigate whether there is a relation between
corruption level and long-term growth rate. Since the CPI
reflects the quality of governing and administration in a
given country, which traditionally requires considerable
time to change, we hypothesize that there may be relation
between the current corruption level of a country and its
growth rate over a wide range of time horizons. To test this
hypothesis we estimate the long-term growth rate for each
country as the slope of the least square fit to the plot of
log(gdp) versus year over the past several decades, where
the gdp is taken as constant prices in national currency
[Fig. 8]. We divide all countries into four groups accord-
ing to the World Bank classification based on gdp [35]. We
find a strong positive dependence between country group
average of CPI and the group average long-term growth
rate, showing that less corrupt countries exhibit significant
economic growth while more corrupt countries display in-
significant growth rates (or even display negative growth
rates) [Fig. 9]. Repeating our analysis for different time
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Fig. 5. Zipf plots ranking in decreasing order the GDP per capita (gdp) for the same groups of countries and for the same
years as shown in Fig. 1. Data on GDP per capita are obtained from the International Monetary Fund as current prices in U.S.
dollars [28]. Fitting lines indicate exponential behavior for the GDP per capita for countries below rank 30 (vertical dashed line,
shown also in Fig. 1), characterized by the exponential decay constant ζgdp . Log-log plots of the ranking curves (shown in the
insets) indicate a crossover from an exponential to a power-law behaviour for the top 30 wealthiest countries. We note that the
top 30 wealthiest countries cluster above the fitting curves in Fig. 1, Fig. 2 and Fig. 4.
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Fig. 6. Zipf plots ranking in decreasing order the CPI for the same groups of countries and for the same years as shown in Fig.
1 and Fig. 5. Fitting lines indicate exponential behavior for the CPI for countries below rank 30 (vertical dashed line, shown
also in Fig. 1 and Fig. 5), characterized by the exponential decay constant ζCPI . The ratio ζCPI/ζgdp consistently reproduces
the value of the power-law exponent µ in Fig. 1(a) - Fig. 1(d) for each corresponding year and each group of countries. This
indicates that a necessary condition for the power-law relation between CPI and GDP per capita is that the GDP per capita
rank order of countries is similar to the rank order based on CPI. Log-log plots of the ranking curves (shown in the insets)
indicate a crossover from an exponential to a power-law behaviour for the top 30 least corrupt countries, similar to the cross
over behaviour observed for gdp in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 7. Log-log plots of the CPI versus the amount of direct investment on a historical-cost basis from the United States received
by different countries for the year 2004 [29]. We observe strong positive correlation between level of investment per capita and
level of corruption — countries with high CPI receive also larger investment. Shown are (a) 34 European countries, (b) 20
Asian-Pacific countries, (c) 25 Latin-American countries and (d) 27 African countries. Note the striking difference between the
typical values of direct investment per capita when comparing, say, European countries and African countries, with typical
values of CPI ≈ 5 and CPI ≈ 2.5 respectively. The correlation coefficients of the fits in (a), (b), (c) and (d) are 0.74, 0.83,
0.69 and 0.37 respectively. Note that although China receives a huge net inflow of U.S. investment each year, the per capita
investment from the U.S. is not very high, and is quite similar to the U.S. per capita investment for countries with a CPI value
similar to that of China.
horizons (1990-2005; 1980-2005) we find similar relations
between the CPI and the long-term growth, indicating a
link between corruption and economic growth.
In summary, the functional relations we report here
can have implications when determining the relative level
of corruption between countries, and for quantifying the
impact of corruption when planning foreign investments
and economic growth. These quantitative relations may
further facilitate current studies on spread of corruption
across social networks [36], the emergence of endogenous
transitions from one level of corruption to another through
cascades of agent-based micro-level interactions [37,38],
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Fig. 8. Long-term growth rate of the GDP per capita (gdp)
measures as constant prices in national currency [28] over the
period 1980 to 2005. Seperate curves represent countries of
different wealth and corruption level from different continents.
All countries exhibit exponential growth characterized by av-
erage long-term growth rate τ , estimated for each country as
the slope of the least square fit to the plot of log(gdp) versus
year over the period 1980 to 2005. The fitting line indicates
the long-term growth rate τ of United States over the period
1980 to 2005.
as well as when considering corruption in the context of
certain cultural norms [39].
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